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Much attention has been focussed on the industrial rise of the Third Italy. This particular type of
industrial development has been characterized by the growth of a large number of local
networks of flexible, small and medium-sized firms, specialised in craft-based industries (such
as clothing). It has often been mentioned that the particular social structure in the Third Italy (in
terms of common values and norms, etc.) provided a basis on which this particular form of
industrial development could emerge. In fact, this social-cultural dimension has been linked to
relations of “trust”, or “social capital”, which not only stimulated interaction and co-ordination
between the local actors but also enhanced the flexibility of the local production systems in
many respects.
However, few studies have actually provided empirical support for these theoretical statements.
We present a long-term spatial analysis of Italy, which aims to explain the industrial rise of the
Third Italy region in the post-war period. It attempts to assess empirically the impact of local
conditions (including the socio-cultural dimension) on regional growth in small-scale, traditional-
artisanal industries in Italy during the period 1951-1991. We have made use of several
statistical techniques in order to determine which potential factors (such as a culture of co-
operation, a tradition of small-scale industry in artisanal sectors, a supply of low-cost, flexible
labour, etc.) could be held responsible for the particular form of industrial development in the
Third Italy area.
By doing so, we also focus attention on the extent to which the industrial rise of the Third Italy
region was a rather accidental event that could also have occurred in other regions such as the
First Italy (the industrial heartland of the North) and the Second Italy (the backward South).2
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1. Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to make an attempt to assess the impact of social capital on
regional economic development. Here, we refer to social capital as “features of social
organisation, such as trust, norms and networks that improve the efficiency of society by
facilitating coordinated action” (Putnam, 1993, p. 167). In economic terms, these relations of
trust are believed to be highly beneficial because they lower transaction costs, favour
transmission and exchange of knowledge, and stimulate the effectiveness and responsiveness of
institutions of governance, such as government policy (Fukuyama, 1995; Knack & Keefer, 1997).
This paper focuses on a long-term analysis of Italy in order to assess empirically the
impact of this socio-cultural dimension on the economic performance of regions. Since Bagnasco
(1977), much has been said on the industrial rise of the so-called Third Italy (that is, the
Northeast and Central part of Italy) in the post-war period. Most attention has attracted the
particular nature of this development, based on a large number of local networks of flexible,
small and medium-sized firms specialised in craft-based industries. Some have stated that this
particular form of industrialisation in the Third Italy area emerged on the basis of a distinctive
social structure that encouraged interaction and co-ordination between the local economic actors
(Trigilia, 1986).
However, it is remarkable how few studies have been carried out to provide empirical
support for these theoretical statements. Many detailed case studies of particular industrial
districts have addressed this topic and have provided insight in the actual relationship between
trust and regional economic development. However, they all remain very descriptive while they do
not allow for making a comparison between these areas. Other empirical studies with a broader
focus (Putnam, 1993; Helliwell & Putnam, 1995) have associated social capital with economic
development in general rather than with the aforementioned particular type of industrial
development in which it is expected to play a crucial role.
This paper makes a first attempt to fill these empirical gaps in the literature. First, we
make use of discriminant analysis in order to determine the extent to which the Third Italy area
could be considered an unique area with particular socio-cultural characteristics during its initial
stage of development. In other words, we examine the question whether this type of social culture
could also be found in the First Italy (the industrial heartland of the Northwest) and the Second
Italy (the backward South). Secondly, we make use of a multiple regression technique in order to
determine empirically the degree to which a local culture of trust has actually contributed to the4
growth of this particular type of industrial development in this part of Italy during the post-war
period.
To address these questions, this paper is divided in three parts. To start with, Section 2
discusses the relationship between social capital and economic development in general. More in
particular, we devote attention to problems of how to define social capital and in what ways it
may have impact on economic growth. In Section 3, we set out the main features of the particular
type of industrial development that took place in the Third Italy during the post-war period.
Moreover, we link this form of industrialisation explicitly to the notion of social capital. In
Section 4, we present the main outcomes of the long-term analysis of Italy. To begin with, we
explain how we measure social capital in the Italian case. Then, we set out what kind of
methodology we used in order to examine empirically whether a culture of trust could be held
responsible for the fact that this particular form of industrialisation took place in the Third Italy
area, and not elsewhere in Italy. Finally, we present the main outcomes. In Section 5, we make
some concluding remarks.
2. Social capital and economic development
Recently, there has been a remarkable interest in the social foundations of economic development
(Fukuyama, 1995; Landes 1998; Nyfer, 1997). Mainstream economics has ignored this non-
economic dimension of economic growth for a long time. This is not to deny that some
economists have given witness of the importance of culture for economic growth in the past (e.g.
Arrow, 1972). However, it is fair to say that neo-classical economics regards actors as individual
persons who act independently and maximise their utility. In other words, their actions do not
undergo any impact of the social context, such as norms, social networks and trust (Coleman,
1990, p. S95-6). Sociologists who have traditionally taken a more structural approach towards
the real world have been more eager to link culture to economic development (see Granovetter).
For example, Weber acknowledged a long time ago that countries dominated by Protestantism
can regularly be associated with high levels of entrepreneurship and trust. It is interesting to see
how these ideas are again echoed in recent influential works of Fukuyama (1995) and Landes
(1998) and reconfirmed by empirical studies (see e.g. Knack & Keefer, 1997).
This section discusses the recent literature on the relationship between social capital and
economic development. In Section 2.1, we devote brief attention to problems of what is social5
capital, and how may it be defined. In Section 2.2, we set out in what ways social capital may
have impact on economic growth. We also discuss empirical studies that have addressed this
issue. In Section 3.3, we explicitly link the notion of social capital to the particular form of
industrialisation that developed in the Third Italy area in the post-war period. By doing so, we
explain that social capital gets a different and more direct meaning when linking it to this type of
industrial development.
2.1    What is social capital?
There exist many definitions of social capital since Loury introduced this notion. The following
definitions have been taken from the most recent literature on the subject. The World Bank
defines social capital as “the norms and social relations embedded in the social structures of
societies that enable people to coordinate action to achieve desired goals”
(www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital). According to Morgan (1997), “social capital refers to
features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and trust, that facilitate coordination and
cooperation for mutual benefit” (p. 493). This definition comes close to the one of Putnam et al.
(1993) who refer to “trust, norms and networks that improve the efficiency of society by
facilitating coordinated action” (p. 167). Knack & Keefer (1997) refer to “trust and norms of
civic-minded behaviour as manifestations of social capital” (p. 1252). Fukuyama (1995) views
social capital as a component of human capital “… that allows members of a given society to
trust one another and cooperate in the formation of new groups and associations” (p. 90).
In general, these definitions are all very broad, incorporating many aspects, such as
networks, norms and trust. Accordingly, it seems very difficult to grasp the essence of social
capital because of its intangible nature. According to Coleman (1990), “if physical capital is
wholly tangible, being embodied in observable material form, and human capital is less tangible,
being embodied in the skills and knowledge acquired by an individual, social capital is less
tangible yet, for it exists in the relations among persons” (p. S100-1).
However, the definitions tend to share the view that social capital may perform an
important asset function or may constitute a productive resource that enables co-operation and
lowers transaction costs in general. Coleman (1990) states that social capital should be seen as a
productive resource within a structure of relations between actors available to actors. This is
especially true when the social structure is characterised by a high rate of closure. For example,
norms can only become effective when sanctions actually constrain the actions of actors that have
conducted deviant behaviour. Moreover, game theory teaches us that social capital leads to co-6
operative solutions because norms of civic co-operation impose negative externalities on free-
riders (Knack & Keefer, 1997). However, although trust is an extremely valuable resource, trust
is not a commodity that can be bought at the market place. We elaborate on these issues more in
detail in the next section.
2.2  Social capital and economic development
There may be five ways to link the notion of social capital to economic performance. We briefly
describe each of them in the following. Then, we discuss two contrasting views concerning the
impact of associational activity on economic performance.
First of all, social capital is a prerequisite for transactions to take place. Uncertainty is
everywhere. When there is no trust potential actors can build on, they are very reluctant to enter
in a transactional activity because uncertainty and risks are too high. This is especially true for
so-called trust-sensitive transactions, such as goods that are delivered in exchange for future
payment (Knack & Keefer, 1997). For example, in a low-trust society, savers would not put their
money on banks, banks would be very reluctant to supply capital for investment, and firms would
be unable to realise their investment plans due to a shortage of capital. According to Knack &
Keefer (1997), “societies characterized by high levels of trust are also less dependent on formal
institutions to enforce agreements. Informal credit markets dependent on strong interpersonal
trust can facilitate investment where there is no well-developed formal system of financial
intermediation, or where lack of assets limits access to bank credit” (p. 1253).
Second, social capital may lower transaction costs. When there is high trust, there is less
need to specify all details of a transaction in formal written contracts. Norms that are shared
effectively constrain opportunistic behaviour. There is also less need to put much effort to control
and monitor the execution of the transaction. Moreover, there are less likely to be costly juridical
conflicts between partners. For example, Harrison (1992) has interpreted the tremendous growth
in lawsuits in Silicon Valley in the United States as evidence of ‘potential erosion in the social
basis’ for further economic development of this region. Thus, transactions based on trust and
shared norms are expected to be more efficient and, thus, less costly than explicit contracting and
monitoring, and much more effective than enforcement by the state (Putnam, 1993).
Third, social capital facilitates the transmission and exchange of information and
knowledge. When there is a high rate of trust, communication proceeds relatively smoothly. This
is especially important for the transmission of non-codified or tacit knowledge, which is, by
nature, much more difficult to communicate (Malmberg & Maskell, 1997; Storper, 1997).7
Moreover, there is a growing awareness that innovations are more often the result of interaction
and co-operation between actors rather than the outcomes of independent actions of isolated firms
or other organisations (Boschma, 1999). Therefore, social capital in high-trust societies may play
a very active role in interactive learning and thus, in stimulating innovations (Morgan, 1997).
Fourth, social capital may stimulate the effectiveness and responsiveness of institutions of
governance, such as government policy. This relationship between social capital and institutional
performance has been confirmed on the regional level by an empirical study of Putnam (1993) in
Italy. A reason for this is that civic norms may be helpful to overcome the collective action
problem in monitoring politicians and other public actors. Moreover, social cohesion (consensus)
may have a positive impact on policy flexibility when changing circumstances require so. When
institutional performance increases, it may have a positive effect on the business climate. In
particular, in high-trust societies, governments are more likely to be reliable and trustworthy,
which makes it less risky for firms to engage in long-term investments. This is especially true in
high-income societies where governments have more taxes to spend in order to provide good
services and where educated people have more demands with respect to the quality of the public
services offered. However, Knack & Keefer (1997) warn for the danger of reverse causality,
because public institutions may be causes of, as well as substitutes for trust and civic co-
operation. That is, on the one hand, “if formal institutions enforce private agreements and laws
more effectively, trust and adherence to civic norms among private citizens may be strengthened”
(p. 1279). However, on the other hand, “societies with low trust require more robust formal
institutions if they are to undertake the exchanges that are crucial to growth. … Without such a
government, cooperation would be nearly impossible and trust would be irrational” (p. 1279).
Fifth, social capital may stimulate the accumulation of human capital. This is because in
high-trust societies, firms are more likely to hire people because of their educational
classifications rather than because of blood ties or personal knowledge. Moreover, Coleman
(1990) has demonstrated that social capital in the family and in the community does affect the
formation of human capital, which he measured as a reduction in the probability of dropping out
of high school.
However, there is anything but agreement in the literature on these positive impacts of
social capital on economic performance. In essence, there are two conflicting views that point to
adverse impacts of social capital (or more in particular, associational activity) on economic
development. On the one hand, Putnam stresses the overall positive impact of associations on
economic development. According to Putnam (1993), associations “… instill in their members
habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public-spiritedness” (pp. 89-90), which provide solutions to8
overcome collective action problems. On the other hand, Olson (1982) highlights the negative
impact of rent-seeking associations on economic welfare. This may occur when their economic
self-interest goes at the expense of society’s welfare at large (see also Porter, 1990). Grabher
(1993) has argued that associations may even be self-destructing because they may result in a
loss of dynamics and innovative behaviour due to lock-in (Boschma & Lambooy, 1999).
According to Knack & Keefer (1997), empirical research has not led to any final result with
respect to this debate. They found in a broad study based on the World Values Surveys for a
sample of 29 market economies that group membership had no significant effect on economic
growth during the period 1980-1992.
Finally, we draw attention to some empirical studies on this subject. These studies tend to
share the view that social capital exhibits a positive impact on economic performance. The study
done by Knack & Keefer (1997) mentioned previously, concluded that social capital has a strong
and significant relationship to economic growth over the 1980-1992 period (this is, however, less
true for the period 1960-1992). Another finding was that the impact of trust on growth is higher
in poorer countries. In fact, “trust is more essential where contracts are not reliably enforced by
the legal system, and where access to formal sources of credit is more limited due to an
underdeveloped financial sector” (p. 1260). This stands in contrast to the view that “greater
specialization increases the number of transactions between strangers, and over time and across
space..., trust should reduce transaction costs more in richer than in poorer countries …” (Knack
& Keefer, 1997, p. 1260).
Putnam (1993) carried out an empirical analysis on social capital in order to explain
differences in institutional and economic performance between Italian regions. The main outcome
was a strong difference in institutional performance of regional governments  (e.g., in terms of
efficient provision of public services) between the more civic-minded North and Central part of
Italy and the less civic South of Italy. In another study, Helliwell & Putnam (1995) showed that,
holding initial income constant, Italian regions with a more developed ‘civic community’ had
higher growth rates in the period 1950-1990 period. However, contrary to Putnam’s belief and
finding, Knack & Keefer (1997) concluded in their study that “horizontal networks – as measured
by membership in groups – are unrelated to trust and civic norms (controlling for education and
income) and to economic performance” (p. 1284).
3. The industrial rise of the Third Italy
As stated in the introduction, a large body of literature has suggested that this area in the9
Northeast and Central part of Italy had witnessed the development of a particular form of
industrialisation during the post-war period. Here, we briefly describe the main characteristics of
the Third Italy area, as compared to the other Italian regions. In Section 3.1, we put the industrial
rise of the Third Italy into a historical perspective by presenting industrial growth rates by region
in Italy in the post-war period. In Section 3.2, we devote attention to three features of this
particular type of industrial development in the Third Italy, that is, small-scale industrialisation, a
predominance of craft-based and engineering industries, and the spatially concentrated form of
production in so-called Marshallian industrial districts. The objective of this exercise is to
determine whether the Third Italy area (as compared to other Italian regions) may indeed be
regarded as a particular case in this respect. In Section 3.3, we go more into detail when
considering the peculiar socio-cultural characteristics of the Third Italy area. There, we link the
notion of social capital to this particular form of industrialisation of the Third Italy.
3.1 The industrial evolution of the Third Italy.
Many sources demonstrate that the Central part of Italy had already acquired an average
industrial position with respect tot the North and South of Italy long before the Second World
War (Zamagni, 1993). In the first part of the twentieth century, the Central part of Italy gave
evidence of a stable and modest economic growth that was much higher than the South of Italy
(Zamagni, 1987). In that period, it more or less equalled the growth rate of the industrial
heartland of Italy (the regions of Lombardy, Piedmont and Liguria), better known as the “Old
Industrial Triangle Turin-Milan-Genua” (Bianchi, Casini-Benvenuti and Maltinti 1987). As a
consequence, it would be fair to say that the rapid economic growth of the Third Italy area in the
post-war period was a consolidation of a process that had already been going on for a long time
(Zamagni 1993).
We now take a closer look at the post-war industrial development by region in Italy. In
Figure 1, we have compared the annual industrial growth rates (measured as changes in the
employment of the manufacturing industry) of the three main areas in Italy for the period 1951-
1991. We have defined the three areas as follows. The First Italy concerns the old industrial
heartland in the Northwest of Italy, which consists of the core industrial regions of Lombardy,
Piedmont and Liguria. The Third Italy area is here defined as the Northeast and the Central part
of Italy, which includes the regions of Trentino Alto-Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, Emilia
Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria and Marche. The Second Italy (or ‘Mezzogiorno’) concerns the
remaining part of the South of Italy, including the region Lazio with the capital Rome.10
Figure 1. The annual growth rates of workers in the manufacturing sector in Italy by region
1951-1991
Sources: elaborations from Censimento Generale dell’Industria 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991 (see Boschma, 1998)
As Figure 1 shows, the Third Italy area enjoyed the highest industrial growth in the period 1951-
1991 (apart from the period 1971-1981). In particular, the regions of Emilia Romagna, Marche,
Tuscany, Veneto and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia and Tuscany demonstrated above average industrial
growth levels throughout the whole period. Since the 1960s, the South of Italy has also done
remarkably well (especially the regions of Lazio, Abruzzi-Molise and Puglia). By contrast, the
Northwest (that is, the First Italy) performed quite poorly. However, in the 1980s, all areas,
including the Third Italy, went through a period of industrial decline (see Bianchi, 1994). Figure
2 shows the degree of industrialisation (measured as the number of workers in the manufacturing
industry per 100 inhabitants) by region throughout this same period. It clearly shows how rapid
this process of industrialisation had advanced in the Third Italy area. The Third Italy had almost
reached the same level of industrialisation of the First Italy by 1991. The South, however,





































Figure 2. The number of workers in the manufacturing sector per 100 inhabitants in Italy by
region 1951-1991
Sources: see Figure 1
3.2  The particular type of industrial development in the Third Italy
In Section 3.1, we concluded that the Third Italy area had experienced the highest industrial
growth in Italy in the post-war period. However, this is only part of its story. The industrial
development of the Third Italy has been associated with a particular form of industrial
development, described as “flexible specialisation”, “neo-Fordism”, or “new industrial space”
(Piore & Sabel, 1984; Scott 1988). In short, this type of industrialisation has been associated
with dense networks of flexible, strongly related, mostly small and medium-sized firms in mainly
craft-based industries that are concentrated in specialised industrial districts. It was a surprise to
many that such a particular form of industrialisation could be ever associated with high industrial
growth. We discuss the theoretical logic behind these spatial production systems in Section 3.3.
In this section, we measure empirically whether the Third Italy area (as compared to other two
areas) may indeed be regarded as a particular and unique case in this respect. Here, we confine
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·  the small size of the industrial firms. The importance of small and medium-sized firms for
industrial growth was something quite unexpected. In the 1970s, these were either regarded
as highly dependent on large firms, or as marginal (pre-capitalist) activities that were seen as
inferior as compared to large firms in terms of technology, scale economies, access to capital,
capability to export, etc. (see Becattini, 1989; Bianchi and Gualteri, 1990).
·  the industrial specialisation involved, which was based on traditional, craft-based industries
and machine-tools. These traditional artisanal industries in which these small-sized firms
mainly manifested themselves, had often been predicted a poor future in Western countries.
For one thing, these sectors were conceived to be most vulnerable to competition from low-
wage countries because of their low rates of value-added and low intensity of technology.
·  the spatially concentrated form of industrial production. These small industrial firms were
often located in relatively small areas where they formed highly dynamic and efficient local
production systems that sometimes succeeded to conquer world export markets. These
networks of mostly small and medium-sized firms, characterised by extensive local interfirm
linkages have often been called ‘Marshallian industrial districts’ (Becattini, 1987; Markusen,
1996). Bianchi (1994) described them as follows: “.. a territorial agglomeration of small
firms, normally specialised by product type, product components or process phases, held
together by interpersonal links, by a common “social culture” amongst the workers,
entrepreneurs and politicians and enveloped by an ‘industrial atmosphere’, which circulates
information, favours professional training facilitates the diffusion of innovation, thereby
generating important flows of external-internal economies” (p. 4). The idea that
competitiveness of localities may be associated with organisational and cultural dimensions
was in contrast with the quite common view that the economic performance of localities could
only be defined in terms of costs of transport and location. What is more, few would have
predicted the industrial rise of regions (such as the Third Italy area) that had not experienced
any major industrial development in the past (Pyke and Sengenberger, 1991).
With respect to the small-scale dimension of industrial development in the Third Italy, we
examined the importance of small firms in the manufacturing sector in the various regions of
Italy. As shown in Table 1, the size of the industrial firm has been split into three categories:
small firms (< 50 employees), medium-sized firms (50-500 employees) and large-scale firms  (>
500 employees). The importance of the three categories has been measured in 1951 and 1991
with the aid of location quotients. These have been defined as the proportion of all workers in the13
region employed in the particular size category, divided by the proportion of all workers in Italy
employed in the same size category. Table 1 confirms that small industrial firms are (to some
degree) predominant in the Third Italy. However, this is even more so in the South of Italy in the
early 1950s, which is, by the way, contrary to the situation of 1991. Moreover, the data show
that large-scale industrialisation has hardly made any progress in the Third Italy area. As
expected, large-scale firms are over-represented in the industrial heartland of the First Italy. This
is also true for the Second Italy. The South of Italy shows a remarkable increase in the
importance of this latter category in the period 1951-1991, which is, probably, due to the massive
transfer of large branch plants from the North of Italy in the 1960s and 1970s (Giunta &
Martinelli, 1995).
Table 1. The size of the firms* in the manufacturing sector by region in Italy in 1951-1991,
measured as location quotients
      small firms
1951              1991
medium-sized firms
1951                 1991
      large firms
1951              1991
First Italy 0.71 0.89 1.18 1.15 1.33 1.21
Third Italy 1.13 1.09 0.97 0.97 0.79 0.60
Second Italy 1.59 1.03 0.56 0.78 0.43 1.33
Italy 1,00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
* small firms: < 50 workers; medium-sized firms: 50-500 workers; large firms: >500 workers
Sources: see Figure 1
With respect to the second feature, the industrial specialisation in each region has been measured
by showing the growth rates of employment in some selected traditional, artisanal industries in
the period 1951-1991. Following Bellandi (1989), the following traditional (mainly craft-based)
industries have been selected: textiles, footwear and clothing, leather goods, wood and furniture,
non-metallic mineral products (including ceramics, marble, jewellary), and metallic engineering.
This merely confirms the study of Sforzi (1989), who stated that most industrial districts of Italy
were specialised in artisanal industries, like clothing, footwear, wooden furniture, textiles, and
mechanical engineering. Brusco & Paba (1997) also concluded that industrial districts could
mainly be found in industries (having the highest shares of workers in industrial districts in their
respective industries) like textiles, clothing and footwear, wood and furniture, leather goods and
non-metallic mineral products. However, in contrast to Brusco & Paba (1997), we regarded14
plastics & others as a too diverse sector to be included in our analysis. Table 2 confirms that the
Third Italy shows indeed the highest growth rates of these selected industries as compared to the
other two areas for the period 1951-1991. The Second Italy tends to perform rather well in
industries like wood and furniture, non-metallic mineral products and metallic engineering.
Table 2. The annual growth rates of employment in small and medium-sized firms* in several











First Italy -0,2% -0,8% 0,2% 0,3% -0,1% 3,4%
Third Italy 8,4% 1,9% 3,8% 2,7% 1,3% 8,9%
Second Italy 3,2% 0,6% -0,0% 2,5% 1,9% 6,6%
Italy 3,0% -0,1% 1,3% 1,0% 1,0% 5,4%
* small and medium-sized firms: < 500 workers
Sources: see Figure 1
With respect to the third feature of the Third Italy, that is, the spatially concentrated form of
industrial organisation, we present some literature that made an attempt to identify industrial
districts across the Italian regions (Sforzi, 1989; 1991; Brusco & Paba, 1997). Becattini (1989)
claimed there existed about 60 to 100 industrial districts in Italy, depending on the criteria used.
Sforzi (1989; 1991) made use of geographical, social and economic indicators. He counted a total
amount of 61 Marshallian industrial districts which employed about 906.000 people in 1981
(about 5.4% of all jobs in Italy). As expected, most of the districts involved (46) were actually
located in the Third Italy area, of which the regions of Marche and Veneto stand out in particular.
The Northwest (or First Italy) had developed 13 of them, while only one of them could be found
in the South of Italy.
Brusco & Paba (1997) used four indicators to examine whether the 955 labour market
areas in Italy could be related to a type of industrial development that could somehow be
associated with industrial districts. In order to fulfil this condition, the scores of each area should
be higher than the national average with respect to their degree of industrialisation, their rate of
small-scale industrialisation (less than 100 employees), the degree of industrial specialisation, and
the rate of smallness of the industrial specialisation involved. They counted a total of 149
industrial districts in 1951, employing about 360,000 workers (about 10 per cent of15
manufacturing employment in Italy). These districts were fairly evenly distributed among the
Italian regions, including the South of Italy (regions of Campania and Calabria). However, the
situation had changed in 1991: the 238 industrial districts identified, employing 1.7 million
workers (about 32 per cent of total employment in the manufacturing sector in Italy) were mainly
found in the First and Third Italy areas, as opposed to the South of Italy. In sum, the Third Italy
area, as expected, host many industrial districts, but also the First Italy area does rather well,
leaving behind the Second Italy. We should put in mind, however, that the study of Brusco &
Paba (like others) keeps on suffering from serious drawbacks due to a lack of available data. The
most serious shortcoming is that this analysis does not account for two of the most essential
characteristics of industrial districts, that is, the organisational and cultural dimension. For
example, they ignore the linkages that may have developed between the small and medium-sized
firms involved: there is no distinction being made between small firms operating independently
and small firms that are part of a dynamic network. Moreover, data were not available on the
district level, which is a more detailed level than labour market areas. The method used also
excluded the possibility that industrial districts could be measured in large urban areas (for
instance, the degree of industrialisation in an area should be higher than the national average).
This section has provided evidence of the fact that the nature of industrial development in
the Third Italy area is to some degree distinct from the two other areas in Italy. Despite the fact
that the Third Italy and the Second Italy are characterised by the predominance of small-sized
firms and craft-based industries, the South of Italy did not experience to any degree the
development of industrial districts as in the two other areas. Moreover, the Third Italy differs
from the First Italy in terms of the importance of small-scale industrialisation in craft-based
industries, though the Northwest had generated quite a number of industrial districts.
3.3  Social capital and the Third Italy
Here, we briefly discuss several theoretical frameworks which have been put forward in order to
explain the industrial rise of the Third Italy. By doing so, we make explicit what role social
capital may have played in the rise of this form of industrialisation in the Third Italy area during
the post-war period. In this respect, we elaborate on the theoretical ideas put forward in Section 2
and associate them explicitly to the type of industrial development as described above. Since the
1970s, there have been several attempts to explain the industrial rise of the Third Italy (Becattini
1987). In a nutshell, we discuss the most influential ones, without pretending to be exhaustive.16
It was quite common in the 1970s to reduce this form of industrial development in the
Third Italy to external factors (Paci 1973; Graziani 1975; Goglio 1982). They referred to the
strategy of large corporations in the Northwest of Italy to decentralise their production in order to
circumvent restrictions imposed by the trade unions. This led to the development of small and
medium-sized firms, which, therefore, depended heavily on these large firms (Goglio 1982). The
result of this strategy of large corporations was that labour costs could be reduced and the
flexibility of labour could be re-established. This dependency relationship or “division of labour”
was mainly expressed in two ways (Brusco 1991). Either the small and medium-sized firms
absorbed the (temporary) high peaks of demand which exceeded the capacity of production of the
large corporations (in the case of the same product) (Paci 1973), or the small and medium-sized
firms operated as major suppliers to the large corporation (Graziani 1975).
However, this explanation is far from persuasive for several reasons. To start with, it is
hard to reconcile the high industrial growth rates in both the First Italy and the Third Italy since
the early 1950s (as Table 1 demonstrated) with this tendency of large firms to decentralise their
production from the late 1960s onwards. Further, this explanation is not consistent with the fact
that trade and capital flows between the First and the Third Italy have hardly been observed. Last
but not least, it ignores the importance of endogenous (that is, autonomous) growth based on the
dynamics of local production systems with an extreme division of labour among local firms.
Nevertheless, this approach may be relevant to some extent. It remains plausible that the First
Italy, in contrast to the Third Italy, failed to adjust to market changes requiring (labour)
flexibility in some traditional industries. This may, for instance, provide an explanation for why
the Lombardy region witnessed a decline in footwear production of 29% in the period 1951-1981,
whereas the Third Italy demonstrated an increase of production in the same period (Bruni 1986).
The so-called Florentine school (Becattini 1987; 1989) has interpreted the industrial rise of
the Third Italy as an endogenous growth process. In essence, this growth process was achieved
through interaction and co-operation based on (economic, geographical and cultural) localness in
these local production systems. In particular, this school of economic thinking has stressed the
unique advantages of the organisational features of the industrial districts described in Section
3.2. The efficiency of the local networks has been explained in terms of a combination of
competition (stimulating dynamics and innovations), specialisation (social division of labour) and
co-operation (minimising uncertainty and opportunism, stimulating exchange of knowledge and
information, and lowering transaction costs) between the local actors (Bertini, 1994). They
emphasise the fact that the small, vertically disintegrated firms operating in those local production
systems could benefit from the unique coexistence of (external) scale economies and flexibility.17
Therefore, the Third Italy area was particularly suited to respond to the differentation of demand
(that is, demand for more varied and customised goods, produced in short series) since the 1970s.
Fuà & Zacchia (1983) and Pyke & Sengenberger (1991), among others claimed that this
endogenous growth process necessitated several pre-conditions, such as a tradition of small-scale
artisanal production, which were typical for the Third Italy area. They have mentioned the
particular socio-cultural structure in the Third Italy as one of these, because it constituted a
propitious environment for the particular type of industrial development described in the previous
section. Harrison (1992) has proposed to link this socio-cultural dimension to relations of trust,
or social capital, as described in Section 2: “the industrial district model posits a very strong form
of the embedding of economic relations into a deeper social fabric” (p. 479). The distinctive
social structure of the Third Italy might have provided a basis on which this form of industrial
development emerged, because it not only stimulated interaction and facilitated co-ordination
between local actors, but it also enhanced flexibility in many respects (Becattini, 1989). Storper
(1997) claimed that the regional level may play an essential part here. As Harrison (1992) puts it,
“… it may be that trust, and other forms of social capital, are best developed at the regional level,
because this is the level at which regular interactions, one of the conditions for trust-building, can
be sustained over time” (p. 501).
The reasons put forward in Section 2.2 may again be applied here to underline the
importance of social capital for the industrial performance of the Third Italy in the post-war
period. However, we would like to link the notion of social capital more explicitly to the
particular form of industrialisation of the Third Italy described in Section 3.2.
First, the extreme division of labor between the many small firms necessitates a culture of
trust, which facilitates the smooth exchange of commodities and lowers the costs of the many
transactions that take place in the industrial districts (Scott, 1988). This is enhanced by the fact
that the network-based mechanisms of co-operation and co-ordination between the local economic
actors are based on so-called horizontal relations rather than vertical relations of power and
dependency. However, Markusen (1996) remarked that “…critics argue that the power of large
corporations to shape Italian industrial districts has been understated” (p. 301).
  Secondly, trust among the local actors favours the transmission and exchange of tacit
knowledge at the district level, which is essential for small firms to learn and innovate. As “tacit
knowledge is collective in nature, and, because it is wedded to its human and social context, it is
more territorially-specific” (Harrison, 1992, p. 479). The GREMI-group (Camagni, 1991)
introduced the notion of ‘innovative milieu’ in order to explain the clustering of vertically
disintegrated firms specialised in a particular techno-industrial field in terms of collective learning18
embedded in a regional context. That is, collective learning in the industrial districts is achieved
through the intra-regional mobility of human capital (as the main carrier of tacit knowledge), the
transfer and feedback of information via dense, informal networks of local actors, and a common
local culture of trust based on shared practices and rules.
Thirdly, local relations of trust encourage the co-ordination and co-operation mechanisms
that are so vital for the competitiveness of the small firms. Generally speaking, small firms lack
the resources to be successful on export markets, to do their own research, to negotiate with large
banks for loans at favourable terms etc. The importance of relations of trust here is that they
provide them the means to realise this (Dei Ottati, 1995). As Harrison (1992) puts it, “firms are
said to co-operate on getting new work into the district, in forming consortia to obtain cheap
credit, in jointly purchasing raw materials, in bidding on large projects and in conducting joint
research” (p. 478).
Fourthly, local traditions and political institutions contributed to the particular form of
industrialisation in the Third Italy, mainly because these regulated potential social conflicts and
achieved political and social cohesion (Sabel, 1989). Fuà (1981) and Trigilia (1986) talked about
the existence of political sub-cultures that cut across social cleavages. The local sub-cultures are
deeply rooted into a common culture and closely linked with a tradition of co-operation in these
areas. This boosted, in particular, the flexibility of the labour market. The dynamic functioning of
the industrial districts demanded from labour a flexible attitude, which was enhanced in the Third
Italy area by a lack of labour militance, limited class polarisation (high rate of social mobility)
and the importance of family business (close ties between family members stimulated flexibility).
The high flux of labour market activity could be maintained without major frictions. This is
because the social networks guaranteed a rapid flow of information about new job opportunities,
and because a ‘social compromise’ between the local interest groups (government, entrepreneurs,
unions) did not impose any rigidity on the flexibility of the work force (Trigilia, 1994).
4. The importance of social capital for the industrial rise of the Third Italy
In the previous section, we described the particular nature of industrial development in the Third
Italy area, and we made explicit the role social capital may have played in the development of this
form of industrialisation. The second part of this paper makes an attempt to assess empirically
the importance of social capital for the rise of this type of industrial development in the Third
Italy. To begin with, we explain in Section 4.1 how we measured social capital. In Section 4.2, a
simple discriminant technique is applied to test the proposition stressed by the literature that the19
Third Italy area could be considered a unique area as compared to other regions with respect to
particular socio-cultural characteristics. In Section 4.3, we make use of a multivariate regression
technique to determine empirically the degree to which a local culture of trust actually contributed
to the growth of this particular type of industrial development in this part of Italy during the post-
war period.
4.1 How to measure social capital?
To begin with, we explain how we measured social capital. As set out in the introductory part, it
is remarkable how few studies have been carried out to provide empirical support for theoretical
statements concerning the importance of social capital for regional development. We present and
discuss the variables we used in our empirical research. By doing so, we also devote attention to
other empirical studies that have made an attempt to measure social capital.
As noticed in Section 2.1, it has been difficult to determine what is actually meant by the
notion of social capital. This is even more so when measuring the stock of social capital (Solow,
1995). This is not to say that no efforts have been made in this respect. Knack & Keefer (1997)
among others (Nyfer, 1997) did a study on trust and civic norms with the assistance of the World
Values Surveys. Here, ‘trust’ was rather arbitrarily measured by “the percentage of respondents
in each nation replying “most people can be trusted”” (p. 1256), which was supposed to indicate
the “… expectations of whether others will act opportunistically at one’s expense” (p. 1258).
‘Norms of civic co-operation’ were measured by assessing the trustworthiness of respondents.
They were asked whether it is justified: “ to claim government benefits which you are not entitled
to, to avoid a fare on public transport, to cheat on taxes if you have the chance, to keep the
money you have found, and to fail to report damage you’ve done accidentally to a parked vehicle”
(p. 1256). Putnam (1993) and Helliwell & Putnam (1995) measured a composite index of ‘civic
community’, which consisted of three dimensions. The first one is ‘civic engagement’, which is
associated with newspaper readership and turnout in referenda. The second refers to horizontal
association or group membership, which is gauged by the density of sports and cultural
associations. The third one is based on the incidence of preference voting at national elections
which is regarded as “a surrogate for clientelism and thus for noncivic community” (Tarrow,
1996, p. 391).
We have selected three variables to assess ‘culture of trust’, for which reliable data were
available by region in Italy in the early 1950s. The first indicator included in our analysis
concerns the number of economic co-operative organisations (consumer-oriented as well as20
producer-based). This type of economic organisation has been regarded as a form of ‘organised
but voluntary social solidarity’ (Putnam 1993, p. 140). In this way, the intensity of co-operative
associations reflects a culture of co-operation, in which the members have shown a willingness to
collaborate in order to achieve mutually beneficial ends (Fornasari & Zamagni, forthcoming).
Harrison (1992) has described the importance of co-operative movements in Italian regions,
which provided all kinds of services to its members, such as financing, technical assistance,
training and marketing.  In 1951, there was a total number of 14,331 co-operatives in Italy which
were divided among the following categories: consumers-oriented (20%), producer & labour-
oriented (32%), agriculture (13%), construction (25%), transport (1%), fishery (1%) and others
(7%) (SVIMEZ, 1961). Another data source (Manufacturing and Trade Census, 1951) registered
a total amount of 10,782 co-operatives in 1951 that employed about 138,000 people (excluding
the agricultural sector). In our analysis, we took the variable ECONCOOP as a proxy for the co-
operative form of economic organisation, which is measured as the share in the total number of
economic co-operatives by region in 1951.
The second measure of ‘culture of trust’ is the incidence of preferential votes during
national elections. We follow the interpretation of Putnam (1993), among others (Katz & Bardi,
1980) who claim that “preference voting can be taken as an indicator for the absence of civic
community” (p. 94). According to Putnam, “… the preference vote is used in Italy to assure
individual benefits, not to anchor a policy preference” (Tarrow, 1996, p. 391). Therefore, it is
likely to reflect vertical bonds of patronage and clientelism. However, it should be taken into
consideration that this indicator may be criticised. Tarrow (1996) states that “… preference
voting can be used as a measure of clientelism, but this does not help explain how it relates to the
civic virtues that Putnam elucidates theoretically…. One might argue intuitively, contra Putnam,
that since preference voting is based on knowing the individual candidates, it is a positive element
in civic involvement…. It is what usually accompanies preference voting in southern Italy –
corruption and clientelism – that makes it inimical to what Putnam sees in the civic community”
(p. 391). Therefore, we follow the suggestion made by Tarrow that this indicator should only be
used as a negative indicator of civic virtue. We measure the variable PREFVOTE as the number
of preferential votes per 100 voters during the 1953 national elections.
The third and last measure of ‘culture of trust’ we use is the density of associations that
may include religious organisations, cultural activities, sport clubs, etc. Following Putnam
(1993), this indicator is used as a proxy for civic sociability, because the intensity of associations
may reflect a high rate of social interaction that builds trust and co-operative habits between its
members. According to Knack & Keefer (1997), “the underlying idea is that such relationships21
either break down information asymmetries or create a pattern of repeated interactions that allow
self-enforcing agreements to be reached; people who belong to such networks “trust” others who
belong to them, and are more likely to exhibit civic behavior” (p. 1278). The variable
ASSOCIAT measures the regional share (in %) of recreational and cultural associations (such as
soccer clubs, choral society, etc.) in 1982 though founded before 1960. These data have been
taken from the Associational Census of 1982 (Mortara, 1985). A drawback of this measure is the
fact that it excludes associations that existed in the 1950s but which had disappeared in 1982.
Nevertheless, an advantage of this might be that we only account for the more durable and long-
lasting associations in our analysis.
 4.2 Is the Third Italy an unique are with respect to social capital?
In the Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we examined whether the Third Italy area was a unique area
concerning its industrial growth rate and its type of industrial development in the post-war period.
Our main conclusion was that it was to a considerable degree. In Section 3.3, we made clear that
according to a large body of literature, a culture of trust could largely be held responsible for the
industrial rise of the Third Italy. Therefore, we now examine whether the Third Italy area is
indeed a unique area during its initial stage of development (that is, in the early 1950s) with
respect to its score on the three social capital indicators described in Section 4.1. Then, in Section
4.3, we determine empirically the degree to which a culture of trust has actually contributed to the
growth of this particular type of industrial development in this part of Italy during the post-war
period.
We have taken the 20 standard administrative regions of Italy. However, we carried out the
final analysis only with 17 regions because of several reasons. First, we needed to aggregate the
regions of Piedmont and Aosta because of the small size of the latter. Moreover, we have taken
together the regions of Veneto and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia and the regions of Abruzzi and Molise
because of missing values. It goes without saying that we would have preferred to measure the
impact of social capital on the appropriate spatial level, that is, on the more disaggregated level of
industrial districts. However, lack of appropriate data at this level made this impossible.
Nevertheless, as Section 3.2 demonstrated, a considerable number of industrial districts could be
observed in a limited number of administrative regions (mainly in the Third Italy area) which
might imply that the impact of social capital extends well beyond the level of the industrial
district. This might indicate that a culture of trust operates on a more aggregated spatial level,
which is suggested by the literature as well.22
The statistical method we use is discriminant analysis. Our objective is to examine whether
it makes sense to split Italy into three areas (that is, the First, Second Italy and Third Italy) with
respect to the regional scores on the three indicators of culture of trust. This classification
technique allows us to identify linear combinations of the three variables that best characterise the
differences among the groups, resulting in two canonical equations. We included all three
variables, ignoring whether they do or do not aid to discriminate between the three groups.
Moreover, we explored which of the variables were most influential in discriminating among
these groups. The results are summarised in Table 3.
Table 3. Group statistics of the discriminant analysis


















































Sources: SVIMEZ, 1961, table 382; Scaramozzino, 1979, elaborations on table 1.2; Annuario Statistiche Italiano,
1954, table 137; Galli, 1968, tables 3 and 7; Mortara, 1985, table 6.
As shown in Table 3, there are, as expected, differences between the Three Italy’s. However, the
assumption of equal variances is hardly met: the standard deviations vary greatly across the
groups for all three variables. Nevertheless, it is justifiable to conclude that, on average, the Third
Italy has more ECONCOOP (3.1 versus 2.6 and 2.6), the Second Italy has more PREFVOTE
(42.4 versus 20.4 and 24.2), and the First Italy has more ASSOCIAT (3.6 versus 2.4 and 1.8).
Our analysis shows highly significant differences between the three groups. A chi-square of
25,931 confirms that the means of the two canonical equations are significantly different between
the three groups. In fact, only 14 per cent (Wilks’ lambda of 0.136) of the variance is not
explained by the differences in group means. The first canonical discriminant function accounts
for 97.5 per cent of the total dispersion, to which the variable PREFVOTE shows the greatest23
relative contribution. However, after removing the first canonical variable (function 1), the scores
of Wilks’ lambda and the associated significance level indicate that the centroids of functions 1
and 2 do not differ significantly across the three groups. Finally, we measured the degree of
success of the classification. In our analysis, 88.2 per cent of the cases (15 out of the 17 regions)
were assigned to their correct group. This applies to the 6 regions of the Third Italy and the 8
regions in the Second Italy. However, two out of three regions in the First Italy (that is, the
regions of Piedmonte and Lombardy) were wrongly classified in the Third Italy group.
4.3 The importance of social capital for the industrial rise of the Third Italy
The outcomes of the discriminant analysis in the previous section lead to the conclusion that the
Third Italy is quite a distinct area with respect to culture of trust. As expected, it differs
significantly from the Second Italy. However, we had to reject the hypothesis that the Third Italy
is a unique area, because the regions of the Third Italy shared their socio-cultural features with
two other regions of the First Italy.
In this section, we make an attempt to assess empirically the impact of culture of trust
(measured in the early 1950s) on the growth of the particular form of industrialisation (as
described in Section 3.2) by region in Italy during the post-war period. In other words, we
examine the extent to which this form of industrial development has strongly been rooted in a
local culture of trust. By doing so, we examine whether social capital has indeed constituted a
basis for the industrial rise of the Third Italy during its initial stage of development, and to what
extent a culture of trust should be regarded as sufficient in this respect. In other words, whereas
other empirical studies (Putnam, 1993; Helliwell & Putnam, 1995) have associated social capital
with economic development in general, we have explicitly linked this to the particular type of
industrial development described above in which it is expected to play a crucial role. We make
use of a multiple linear regression technique in order to determine how well the three independent
variables ECONCOOP, PREFVOTE and ASSOCIAT explain cross-regional variation in
industrial growth in Italy over a 30-year period (1951-1981).
First, we explain how we measure the rise of the particular form of industrialisation that
has been associated with the Third Italy area. We decided to take as our dependent variable
INDGROW the annual growth rate in employment in firms with less than 500 people employed
in traditional-artisanal sectors by region in Italy during the period 1951-1981. We have presented
this variable in Figure 3. By doing so, we have covered two of the three main features of this type
of industrial development described in Section 3.2. The typical small-scale industrialisation has24
been accounted for by excluding those firms that employ more than 500 people, whereas the
craft-based nature of this type of industrialisation has been grasped by selecting those
manufacturing industries that could be considered as traditional and artisanal. As explained in
Section 3.2, we included in our analysis the following industries: textiles, footwear and clothing,
leather goods, wood and furniture, non-metallic mineral products (including ceramics, marble,
jewels) and metallic engineering.
However, a shortcoming of this indicator (due to a lack of available data) is that it does not
account for the most essential characteristic of industrial districts described in Section 3.2, that is,
the organisational dimension. In fact, our indicator ignores the linkages that may have developed
between the small and medium-sized firms involved. It is, therefore, impossible to separate the
small firms that operate independently (which we would like to exclude from our analysis) from
the small firms that are part of a dynamic network (see also Brusco & Paba, 1997). Moreover,
another drawback of this indicator is that we measure growth in employment rather than growth
in per capita income. We would have preferred this last indicator because, among other reasons,
it would have allowed us to compare our empirical results with those of other studies on this
subject (e.g. Putnam, 1993). However, as explained before, our main objective is to link social
capital to the particular form of industrialisation in the Third Italy rather than to economic
development in general. This was only possible when using the employment figures provided by
the Manufacturing Census of Italy. In fact, this source enabled us to account for the two features
of this type of industrial development described above.
Figure 3. The annual growth rate in employment in small and medium-sized firms (with less than
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Sources: see Figure 1
As in Section 4.2, we measure a culture of trust in the early 1950s in order to explain the cross-
regional variation in growth of employment in small and medium-sized firms in traditional-
artisanal sectors in Italy during the period 1951-1981. By doing so, we assume that the variables
of culture of trust are rather stable over this period. This is also confirmed in our analysis. That
is, the values of ECONCOOP in 1951 and 1959 are correlated at 0.74, the values of
PREFVOTE in 1953 and 1976 correlate at 0.89, and the values of ASSOCIAT in 1960 and 1982
correlate at 0.94 (all are significant at the 0.01 level). The second reason is that changes in
ECONCOOP (1951-1959) and ASSOCIAT (1960-1982) are uncorrelated with the observed
growth rates for the period 1951-1961 (Pearson coefficient of –0.194) and 1961-1981 (Pearson
coefficient of –0.105) respectively.
The three variables correlate as expected, that is, there is a positive correlation between
ECONCOOP and ASSOCIAT (0.65) and a negative correlation of PREFVOTE with
ECONCOOP (-0.23) and ASSOCIAT (-0.39). However, the correlations are not significant,
except for the correlation between the variables ECONCOOP and ASSOCIAT.
The outcomes of the multiple regression technique are summarised in Table 4. Broadly
speaking, the variables of culture of trust have no significant relationship to economic
performance on the regional level as far the Third Italy-type of industrial development is
concerned during the period 1951-1981. In other words, culture seems to provide a poor
explanation for why some regions in Italy (including the Third Italy area), contrary to other
regions, experienced the particular type of industrial development described in Section 3.2.
With respect to equation 1 (the Y-variable concerns the Third Italy-type of industrial
development), it appears that the coefficients of the variables ECONCOOP (positive) and
PREFVOTE (negative) have the right sign, although they are not significant. The negative
coefficient of ASSOCIAT is, however, not consistent with expectation. On the contrary, as
associational activity increases in a region, its industrial performance tends to decrease. This
latter result shows that associational activity is not related to economic performance, in contrast
to the findings of Putnam. Moreover, the whole model has a poor fit.
Table 4. Social capital and industrial growth by region in Italy, 1951-1981
_____________________________________________________________________________
E q u a t i o n 12326
Constant 3.629E-16 -5.86E-17 5.017E-16
(0.217) (0.212) (0.186)
ECONCOOP 0.516 0.745* 0.229
(0.295) (0.288) (0.277)
PREFVOTE -0.498 -0.287 -0.767*
(0.242) (0.237) (0.204)
ASSOCIAT -0.517 -0.566 -0.183
(0.311) (0.304) (0.279)
Adj. R square .20 .24 .52
SEE 0.89 0.87 0.70
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Sample size is 17 in equations 1 and 2. Sample size is 14 in equation 3.
Asteriks* denote significance at the ten percent level
SEE= Standard Error of the Estimate
Sources: see Figure 1 and Table 3
A plausible reason for why our results deviate from the Putnam analysis discussed in Section 2.2
is that we measure the dependent variable differently. As noticed before, we associate social
capital with a particular type of industrial development in which it is expected to play a crucial
role (that is, small-scale industry in traditional sectors), rather than with economic development in
general. We therefore carried out another regression with regional growth of employment in the
whole manufacturing sector as the dependent variable (INDGROW*). The outcomes of this
analysis are given in equation 2. As shown in Table 4, this additional analysis leads almost to the
same conclusions: the variables PREFVOTE and ASSOCIAT, once again, do not have a
significant impact on annual industrial growth by region in Italy in the period 1951-1981.
Moreover, the coefficient of variable ASSOCIAT is again negative. However, contrary to
equation 1, the variable ECONCOOP now exhibits a large and significant impact on regional
industrial growth. That is, the coefficient for ECONCOOP in equation 2 indicates that a one-
percentage-point rise in that variable is associated with an increase in growth of three-fourths of a
percentage point.
The main reason behind the poor fit of the models is that the observed value of INDGROW
in the First Italy area (especially the regions of Lombardy and Liguria) is much lower than might
be expected from its scores on the social capital variables PREFVOTE, ASSOCIAT and
ECONCOOP. To test this statement, we did another regression on the Y-variable INDGROW
(equation 3), in which we left out the three regions of the First Italy (thus with n=14). There is27
now indeed a good fit of the overall model, although the coefficient of the ASSOCIAT remains
negative. The variable PREFVOTE has now a significant relationship to industrial growth in the
period 1951-1981: the coefficient for PREFVOTE demonstrates that a four-percentage-point rise
of PREFVOTE is associated with an increase in INDGROW of about three-percentage-points.
The good fit of this last model gives evidence of why the Third Italy area, which was well-
endowed with a culture of trust, did much better than the South of Italy to develop this particular
type of industrial development. The Third Italy regions of Trentino and Veneto & Friuli-Venezia-
Giulia are, however, exceptional cases, because they demonstrated a rather poor score on
INDGROW while performing well on the social capital variables. Although we have to be
cautious not to jump into hasty conclusions, the socio-cultural structure of the South of Italy in
the early 1950s did not provide a stimulus for this particular form of industrialisation. This may
well explain why small and medium-sized firms in the Second Italy often operate quite
independently, whereas small and medium-sized firms in the Third Italy area co-operate and form
dynamic networks, as suggested by Fukuyama (1995). However, the regions of Abruzzi-Molise
and Puglia take a rather exceptional position in the South of Italy, because they show a
satisfactory score on INDGROW although doing poorly on the social capital variables.
4.4 Conclusions
This section made some tentative efforts to measure a ‘culture of trust’ that could be explicitly
linked to the form of industrialisation that has been associated with the Third Italy by a large
body of literature. For this purpose, three variables have been selected, that is, the significance of
economic co-operatives as a form of voluntary social solidarity, the incidence of preferential
votes as a negative proxy for civic virtue, and the density of associations as a proxy for civic
sociability. The discriminant analysis showed that, as suggested by the literature, the Third Italy
area was indeed a distinct area with respect to culture of trust in the early 1950s. It gave not only
evidence of a homogenous area with respect to social capital, it also differed significantly from
the Second Italy in this respect. However, we had to reject the proposition that the Third Italy
was a unique area, because some regions of the First Italy (Piedmonte and Lombardy) appeared
to share the same socio-cultural features (such as a low incidence of preferential voting).
The outcome of the multiple regression analysis showed that the culture of trust variables
had no significant impact on regional growth in small-scale, traditional-artisanal industries in28
Italy during the period 1951-1981. Moreover, associational activity is unrelated to economic
performance, to say the least. However, when regional growth of the whole manufacturing sector
is taken as the dependent variable, the variable ECONCOOP exhibits a large and significant
impact on regional industrial growth. Nevertheless, the whole model keeps on demonstrating a
poor fit. This, however, changes when we did another regression, leaving out the regions of the
First Italy. This resulted in a good fit of the model, whereas the variable PREFVOTE turned into
a significant relationship to regional industrial growth.
5.  Conclusion
This paper made an attempt to link empirically the notion of social capital to the rise of the
particular form of industrialisation in the Third Italy, characterised by spatially agglomerated
networks of flexible, small and medium-sized firms operating in craft-based industries. It has
been mentioned by a large body of literature that the particular socio-cultural structure in the
Third Italy (in terms of common values and norms, etc.) provided a basis on which this particular
form of industrial development could emerge. This socio-cultural dimension has been linked to
relations of trust, which not only stimulate interaction and co-ordination between the local actors,
but also enhance the flexibility of the local production systems in many respects. However, there
have been few studies that have actually provided empirical support for these theoretical
statements.
We applied several statistical techniques in order to determine whether a local culture of
trust could be held responsible for this particular form of industrial development in the Third Italy
area. The main results of the analysis point out that the Third Italy area was a distinct but not an
unique area with respect to this social-cultural dimension in the early 1950s. The three culture of
trust variables also showed no significant impact on regional growth in small-scale, traditional-
artisanal industries in Italy during the period 1951-1981. However, when leaving out the regions
of the First Italy, a local culture of co-operation and trust turned into a significant relationship to
industrial growth on the regional level in Italy. This outcome suggests that a local culture of trust
may have been responsible for this particular type of industrial development in the Third Italy
area, in contrast to the South of Italy. The Third Italy area was well-endowed with a favourable
socio-cultural structure, which may have constituted a favourable basis for the development of
the particular form of industrialisation in the 1950s. By contrast, the backward South of Italy29
mainly lacked such a local culture of co-operation and trust. The First Italy area is a particular
case. Generally speaking, the First Italy was a likely candidate to develop this type of industrial
development when its high score on this socio-cultural dimension is considered. However, other
findings suggest that its poor economic performance may be attributed to the fact that it lacked
other preconditions such as a tradition of small-scale, traditional industry and a supply of
flexible, low-cost labour.
There is still much research to be done before we can come to any final conclusions with
respect to this topic. There are at least three fields that deserve more particular attention. First of
all, it has already been mentioned in the paper that is hard to develop indicators that measure the
impact of social capital. We have made use of three variables, which, however, may be criticised
for several reasons. Secondly, a shortcoming of our dependent variable is that it does not account
for the organisational dimension of the Third Italy type of industrial development. Moreover, we
need data on the more disaggregated level of industrial districts in order to assess the impact of
social capital more accurately. Nevertheless, we believe our dependent variable gave us the
possibility to link explicitly social capital to economic performance, because it accounted for the
Third Italy type of industrialisation, in which this socio-cultural factor is believed to play a
crucial role (contrary to studies like Helliwell & Putnam (1995)). Moreover, it is more useful to
analyse the economic impact of social capital on the regional rather than the national level (as
Knack & Keefer (1997)), because it is mainly at this local level that trust is built (Storper, 1997).
Thirdly, we have to be cautious not to treat social capital as a durable resource that may not be
subject to major change in the course of time. In fact, some have argued that the spatial structure
of social capital in Italy sketched above is now under a process of change (Trigilia, 1995;
Tarrow, 1996).30
6. Bibliography
Arrow, K. (1972), Gifts and exchanges, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, pp. 343-62
Bagnasco, A. (1977), Tre Italie: la problematica territoriale dello sviluppo Italiano, Bologna: Il
Mulino.
Bagnasco, A. and R. Pini (1981), Economia e struttura sociale, Quaderni della Fondazione
Feltrinelli, no. 14.
Barca, F. (a cura di) (1997), Storia del capitalismo Italiano dal dopoguerra a oggi, Roma:
Donzelli Editore.
Becattini, G. (a cura di) (1987), Mercato e forze locali: il distretto industriale, Bologna: Il
Mulino.
Becattini, G. (a cura di) (1989), Modelli locali di sviluppo, Milano: Il Mulino.
Bellandi, M. (1989), The role of small firms in the development of Italian manufacturing
industry, in E. Goodman, J. Bamford and P. Saynor (1989) (eds.), Small firms and
industrial districts in Italy, London/New York: Routledge, reprint 1991, pp. 31-68.
Bertini, S. (1994), SME systems and territorial development in Italy, NOMISMA, Laboratorio
di Politica Industriale, working paper no. 6, october.
Bianchi, G. (1994), Requiem for the Third Italy? Spatial systems of small firms and multi-
regional differentiation of the Italian development, paper presented at the XXXIV
European Regional Science Congress, Groningen, the Netherlands.
Bianchi, P. and G. Gualteri (1990), Emilia-Romagna and its industrial districts: the evolution of
the model, in R. Leonardi and R.Y. Nanetti, The regions and European integration: the
case of Emilia Romagna, London/New York: Pinter Publishers, pp. 83-108.
Boschma, R.A. (1996), The window of locational opportunity-concept, Collana di Teoria
Economica, vol. 260, Bologna: Università degli Studi di Bologna, pp. 1-36.
Boschma, R.A. (1997), New industries and windows of lcoational opportunity. A long-term
analysis of Belgium, Erdkunde, vol. 51, pp. 12-22.
Boschma, R.A and G.A. van der Knaap (1997), New technology and windows of locational
opportunity: Indeterminacy, creativity and chance, In: J. Reynders (ed.), Economics and
evolution, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 171-202.
Boschma, R.A. (1999), A long-term sequence of techno-industrial stages. The rise of clusters of
innovative industries, Research Policy, vol. 28, pp. 853-71.31
Boschma, R.A. & J.G. Lambooy (1999), Evolutionary economics and economic geography,
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, vol. 9, pp. 411-29.
Bruni, L. (1986), Dinamica strutturale dell’industria Italiana nel trentennio 1951-1981,
L’industria, vol. 2, pp. 313-26.
Brusco, S. (1982), The Emilian model: productive decentralisation and social integration,
Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 6, pp. 167-84.
Brusco, S. (1986), Small firms and industrial districts: the experience of Italy, in D. Keeble and
E. Wever (eds.), New firms and regional development, Beckenham: Croom Helm, pp.
184-202.
Brusco, S. (1991), La genesi dell’idea di distretto industriale, in F. Pyke, G. Becattini and W.
Sengenberger (1991) (a cura di), Distretti industriali e cooperazione fra imprese in Italia,
Firenze: Banca Toscana, pp. 25-34.
Brusco, S. & S. Paba (1997), Per una storia dei distretti industriali Italiani dal secondo
dopoguerra agli anni novanta, in F. Barca, (a cura di) (1997), Storia del capitalismo
Italiano dal dopoguerra a oggi, Roma: Donzelli Editore, pp. 265-333.
Camagni, R. (ed.) (1991), Innovation networks: spatial perspectives, London/New York:
Belhaven Press.
Cazzola, F. (1975), Partiti, correnti e voto di preferenza, Bologna: Il Mulino.
Coleman, J.S. (1990), Social capital in the creation of human capital, American Journal of
Sociology, vol. 94, S95-S120
Cooke, P. & K. Morgan (1994), The creative milieu: a regional perspective on innovation, in M.
Dodgson & R. Rothwell (eds.), The handbook of industrial innovation, Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar, pp. 25-32.
Eckhaus, R.S. (1961), The North-South differential in Italain economic development, The
Journal of Economic History, vol. XXI, n. 3, pp. 285-317.
Fornasari, M. & V. Zamagni (forthcoming), Il movimento cooperativo in Italia. Un profilo
storico economico (1854-1992).
Fuà, G. (1981), Lo sviluppo economico in Italia. Storia dell’economia Italiana negli ultimi cento
anni, Volume 1, Lavoro e reddito, Milano: Franco Angeli Editore.
Fuà, G. and C. Zacchia (1983) (a cura di), Industrializzazione senza fratture, Bologna: Il
Mulino.
Fukuyama, F. (1995), Trust. The social virtues and the creation of prosperity, London: Hamish
Hamilton.32
Gambetta, D. (ed.) (1988), Trust. Making and breaking cooperative relations, New York: Basil
Blackwell.
Galli, G. (a cura di) (1968), Il comportamento elettorale in Italia, Bologna: Il Mulino.
Garofoli, G. (1983), Industrializzazione diffusa in Lombardia. Sviluppo territtoriale e sistemi
produttivi locali, Milano: Franco Angeli.
Giunti, A. and F. Martinelli (1995), The impact of post-fordist corporate restructuring in a
peripheral region: the mezzogiorno of Italy, in: A. Amin and J. Tomaney (eds.), Behind the
myth of the European Union. Prospects for cohesion, London/New York: Routledge, pp.
221-262.
Goglio (1982)
Grabher, G. (1993), The weakness of strong ties: the lock-in of regional development in the Ruhr
area, in: G. Grabher (ed.), The embedded firm. On the socio-economics of industrial
networks, London/New York: Routledge, pp. 255-77.
Graziani, A. (1975), Crisi e ristrutturazione nell’economia italiana, Torino: Einaudi.
Harrison, B. (1992), Industrial districts: old wines in new bottles, Regional Studies, vol. 26, pp.
469-83.
Helliwell, J. and R. Putnam (1995), Economic growth and social capital in Italy, Eastern
Economic Journal, vol. XXI, pp. 295-307.
Katz, R.S. and L. Bardi (1980), Preference voting and turnover in Italian Parliamentary
Elections,  American Journal of Political Science, vol. 17, pp. 97-114.
Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1997), Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country
investigation, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, november, pp. 1251-88.
Landes, (1998)
Malmberg, A. & P. Maskell (1997), Towards an explanation of regional specialization and
industry agglomeration, European Planning Studies, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 25-41.
Markusen, A. (1996), Sticky places in slippery space: a typology of industrial districts,
Economic Geography, vol. 72, no. 3, pp. 293-313.
Morgan, K. (1997), The learning region. Institutions, innovation and regional renewal, Regional
Studies, vol. 31, no. 5, pp. 491-503.
Mortara, A. (ed.) (1985), Le associazioni Italiane, Collana CIRIEC, 28, Milano: Franco Angeli.
NOMISMA (1993), Laboratoria di politica industriale. Innovazione e ricerca: potenzialita e
vincoli del sistema industriale dell’Emilia-Romagna, Bologna: NOMISMA SpA.
Nyfer (1997), Instituties, waarden, normen en groei, nr. 9, Den Haag:  SDU uitgevers33
Olson, M. (1982), The rise and decline of nations: economic growth, stagflation and social
rigidities, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Paci M. (1973), Mercato del lavoro e classi sociali in Italia, Bologna: Il Mulino.
Piore, M.J. and C.F. Sabel (1984), The second industrial divide. Possibilities for prosperity,
New York: Basic Books.
Porter, M.E. (1990), The competitive advantage of nations, London: MacMillan
Putnam, R.D. (1993), Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy, Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Pyke, F. and W. Sengenberger (1991), Introduzione, in F. Pyke, G. Becattini and W.
Sengenberger (a cura di), Distretti industriali e cooperazione fra imprese in Italia,
Firenze: Banca Toscana, pp. 15-23.
Scaramozzino, P. (1979), Un’analisi statistica del voto di preferenza in Italia, Milano: Dott. A.
Giuffre Editore.
Scott, A.J. (1988), New industrial spaces: flexible production organization and regional
development in North America and Western Europe, London: Pion.
Sforzi, F. (1989), The geography of industrial districts in Italy, in E. Goodman, J. Bamford and
P. Saynor (eds.), Small firms and industrial districts in Italy, Andover: Routledge, pp.
153-73.
Sforzi, F. (1991), I distretti industriali marshalliani nell’economia Italiana, in F. Pyke, G.
Becattini & W. Sengenberger (1991) (a cura di), Distretti industriali e cooperazione fra
imprese in Italia, Firenze: Banca Toscana, pp. 91-118.
Solow, R. (1995), But verify, The New Republic, sept., p. 36
Storper, M. (1997), The regional world: territorial development in a global economy, New
York: Guilford Press.
SVIMEZ (1961), Un secolo di statistiche storiche Italiane Nord e Sud, 1861-1961, Roma.
Tarrow, S. (1996), Making social science work across space and time: a critical reflection on
Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work, American Political Science Review, vol. 90,
no. 2, pp. 389-397.
Trigilia, C. (1986), Grandi partiti e piccole imprese, Bologna: Il Mulino.
Trigilia, C. (1994), Contesto socio-politico e cambiamento dei distretti industriali, in M. Bellandi
and M. Russo (a cura di), Distretti industriali e cambiamento economic locale, Torino:
Rosenberg & Selier, pp. 57-71.
Trigilia, C. (1995) (a cura di), Cultura e sviluppo: l’associazionio nel Mezzogiorno, Catanzaro:
Meridiani Libri.34
Varaldo, R., N. Bellini & A. Bonaccorsi (1997), Tendenze e vie di cambiamento dell’industria
Toscana, Milano: Franco Angeli.
Vitali, O. (1968), La popolazione attiva in agricoltura attraverso i censimenti Italiani (1881-
1961), Roma: Università di Roma, Instituto di Demografia.
Zamagni, V. (1987), A century of change: trends in the composition of the Italian labour force,
1881-1981, Historical Social Research, vol. 44, pp. 36-97.
Zamagni, V. (1993), The economic history of Italy 1860-1990, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Zamagni, V. (forthcoming), Una vocazione industriale diffusa, Einaudi.
Zamagni, V. (1993b), L’offerta di istruzione in Italia 1861-1987: un fattore guida dello sviluppo
o un ostacolo?, no. 4, luglio 1993, working paper, Serie Economia e Storia Economica,
Università degli Studi di Cassino, pp. 1-54.